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ABSTRACT 
 
Warwood, James, M.A., Spring 2016                       English Literature 
 
What Do You Think I Am?: On Perceiving Unintelligibility in the Nonbinary Gender 
Experience 
 
Chairperson: Dr. Casey Charles 
 
 
  What does it mean to be “retired from gender,” and what role does such an identity play 
in daily life? Engaging with the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Judith Butler, this 
project attempts to elucidate the experience of nonbinary – that is, external to the 
male/female gender binary – gendered individuals, and the ultimate unintelligibility of 
that experience. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach to perception allows for an 
exploration of the social norms and regulations that determine how gender is defined in 
Western culture; combined with Butler’s significant work on gender and its 
performativity, phenomenology proves a useful tool for revealing the constructedness of 
gender. Although an arbitrary system, the gender binary serves as a mechanism of so-
called social truth: because the nonbinary reality rejects this truth the nonbinary gender 
performance not only appears unintelligible to the binary other but also represents a 
threat to social stability. This paper uses the memoirs in Gender Failure – written by two 
self-identified nonbinary individuals – to consider how social norms inform binary 
perception and how that perception constitutes the nonbinary self. Perceived from within 
the binary matrix, the nonbinary self appears unintelligible: as a result, the validity of 
their gendered reality is threatened. Conscious of the conceptual gap between nonbinary 
and binary individuals, this project explores gender as the subject of the perceptive act 
and not only outlines the delegitimization of the nonbinary reality but also suggests 
opportunities to make space for non-normative gendered experiences.  
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Introduction 
 
It's almost akin to the Sisyphus myth – the toiling journey of gender 
transition and pushing the boulder higher up the hill, and as soon as the 
perceived summit of inhabiting the other gender is reached, the stone rolls 
down the other side as I realize this gender doesn't provide any lasting 
reflection of my inner self either. So, it must ascend again, over and over, 
each day, as the most fitting expression continually changes. 
– Drew Cordes 
 
 Articulating your personal identity may be as simple as filling out the “About 
Me” section of a dating site profile. Information such as physical appearance, hobbies, 
likes and dislikes is presented with the assumption that the reader will be able to 
assemble a coherent and accurate image of who you are as an individual. However, the 
other person cannot form a unified whole based solely on the information you provide: 
instead, this information acts as superficial additions to a basic – and normative – social 
object. In other words, the reader of your “About Me” presumes that underneath these 
unique qualities is an individual who complies with imposed social norms.  
 The project of this paper is to define such an interpretive act when the perceived 
object does not adhere to a socially sanctioned and normative template. The constrictive 
nature of this template of course means that few people actually fit; in fact the template 
itself seems to be the exception to the reality of human experience. Gender, a stringently 
regulated identity category, stifles this reality to the extent that deviations from the norm 
become unintelligible modes of identity. I focus on nonbinary gender identities – those 
that break from the gender binary altogether – as the ultimate deviation. As a perceived 
object that rejects the normative template, the nonbinary individual cannot be perceived 
as coherent without first explicitly defining the reality of the foundational nonbinary self.  
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 Because the nonbinary self does not fit the regulated gender template, the binary 
other cannot empathetically conceive the reality of that self. In other words, this 
disconnected understanding of gender means that the binary other cannot truly 
understand the nonbinary experience. According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
interpersonal empathy requires common ground, or the potential for shared experiences. 
Without this empathy, the other cannot accurately perceive the reality of the self. 
Certainly this conceptual distance exists between all individuals as nothing can be 
identically experienced by more than one person; however, the oppositional nature of the 
nonbinary self’s relationship to the dominant social structure creates a disconnect so 
fundamental that it can only be cognitively understood by the binary other – in other 
words, true empathy is impossible, meaning that the viability of nonbinary personhood is 
threatened.  
 The work of Gayle Salamon in Assuming A Body: Transgender and Rhetorics of 
Materiality provides a useful starting point for the project of this paper. She draws on the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and the psychoanalysis of Freud for a consideration of 
transgender embodiment and personhood. For Salamon, the transgender body takes shape 
in the intersubjective relationship between self and other. However, where she sees 
bodily constitution in this contact, she does so on the assumption that the body that is 
perceived is legible for the binary. I take up Salamon’s arguments and extend them to 
where the perceived gendered body cannot be recognized: what happens to embodiment 
and personhood when intersubjective relationships cannot construct a coherent self?  
 Throughout this paper I will also engage primarily with Merleau-Ponty as well as 
Judith Butler. I find Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological interest in intersubjective and 
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indeterminate perception makes for a productive consideration of nonbinary specifically 
and gender more generally; a phenomenology of perception breaks apart the perceptive 
act, seeking out the elements that determine why we know what we do. Investigating the 
external influences that inform binary perception and challenge nonbinary presentation, I 
suggest the sources of the incommensurability between these two gender categories. In 
combination with Butler – particularly her work on the origins and performativity of 
gender – the phenomenology of perception produces the foundation for Chapter One, 
which lays out my understanding of the nonbinary existence at its points of contact with 
the gender binary.   
 My purpose here is not to say that binary individuals simply cannot understand 
the nonbinary existence and therefore should not even try; on the contrary, my hope is 
that an understanding of the regulatory nature of the gender binary, and the ways that it 
influences the perception of gendered bodies will allow for a consciousness of the 
compulsory gendering practices in Western societies. While I contend that the empathetic 
gap between nonbinary and binary individuals can never be completely closed, I do think 
that an awareness of gender as it is presented here will make it possible to make space for 
the nonbinary gender experience in the binary imaginary.  
 
I.  Merleau-Ponty and His Phenomenology 
 Merleau-Ponty opens Phenomenology of Perception by acknowledging that no 
sufficient definition of phenomenology exists due to its paradoxical nature. 
Phenomenology claims to study essences abstracted from existence, while also returning 
essences to existence in order to better understand the world. Phenomenology places in 
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abeyance the assumptions of the natural attitude – the set of uncritically adopted beliefs 
about the world – understanding that this attitude presupposes that all meaning is 
available at the surface; at the same time it is a philosophy that must retain such naïveté 
in order to achieve a “direct and primitive contact with the world.” It calls itself a 
rigorous science but tries to describe our experience “as it is” without considering 
physiological origin or causal explanations provided by scientists, historians, or 
sociologists (vii). Given these conflicting interpretations of phenomenology, one may 
wonder whether it is a philosophy with any utility. 
             Literally, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: our perception of things; 
things as we perceive them in our experiences; and our experience of things and of our 
perception of things (Smith). More specifically, phenomenology studies consciousness as 
constructed by our experiences of the world. This investigative project aims to reveal the 
process of acquiring and attributing the meanings that represent objects, and how those 
meanings inform our experiences and thus our consciousness. Phenomenologists consider 
experience as primarily structured by intentionality. Merleau-Ponty defines intentionality 
as the recognition of “consciousness itself as a project of the world, meant for a world 
which it neither embraces nor possesses, but toward which it is perpetually directed” 
(xvii). Intentionality, then, is simply the direction of experiences of consciousness toward 
the world. Individuals experience the world only through this perpetual direction: 
classical Husserlian phenomenology states that certain conditions such as embodiment, 
cultural context, language, or social background enable and shape such direction 
(Smith).1 These conditions make up and inform the acquired meanings of things in a 
                                                
1 For further reading on the foundational phenomenology of Edmond Husserl, see The Idea of 
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given experience. Thus the world only becomes a meaningful object as determined by the 
nature of the intentionality in the moment of experience. 
           Taking in the intention – “the unique mode of existence” – expressed in the 
experience of things allows the phenomenologist to begin to expose the origins of things 
(Merleau-Ponty xviii). A study of origins must be rooted in the description of “things 
themselves,” refusing to judge the world by means not based in my own point of view. 
Explanations of the world not derived from my experience can be nothing for me but 
hypothetical. By transcending the hypothetical through experiential description, the 
phenomenologist can grasp the “real” thing rather than an ideal instituted by an external 
rationale (viii). Such idealism does not allow for the transience and complexity of reality; 
rather than perceive the world according to a single, stable notion, the phenomenologist 
must continuously dismantle their perception in search of further and more complex 
meanings. Phenomenological analysis takes nothing for granted, and is a perpetual 
beginning based on an enduring “’wonder’ in the face of the world;” such wonder persists 
even after a meaning or origin appears to have been revealed. Phenomenological analysis 
founds a transcendental consciousness of the world that demonstrates the strange and 
paradoxical nature of reality (xiii).2 
            Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysical project is not to abstract out the basic structure of reality, 
but to reawaken the complexity and depth of reality by highlighting “the limitations of our 
modern way of looking at things, so that we might ‘transcend’ these limitations” (Marshall 58). 
                                                                                                                                                       
Phenomenology. 
2 Husserl’s transcendental consciousness diverges from Kantian transcendence, which makes the 
world immanent in the subject, precluding a sense of wonder toward the world. The 
transcendental consciousness proceeding from such wonder evinces the impossibility of a 
complete phenomenological analysis of experience (Merleau-Ponty xiv).  
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This project challenges the determinate empirical and intellectual approaches to the problem of 
being: for the former, the real is only what has been experienced; the latter only allows for a 
single, determinate conception of meaning. Merleau-Ponty takes issue with these limiting 
approaches and instead offers a “philosophy of ambiguity,” which allows for an indeterminate 
being, one that is always present in its absence and creates a complex reality in compelling the 
phenomenologist to persistently seek its meaning (ibid.). In this methodology, the incessant quest 
for the ambiguous being results in the accumulation of meanings, which are then challenged, 
replaced, or adjusted as new meanings are incorporated. This process complicates the instinct to 
uncritically perceive the world: the phenomenologist recognizes the limitations inherent in “our 
modern way of looking at things” and consciously continues seeking the reality of the 
indeterminate being. As an act with a permanent beginning, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
perception makes possible a fluctuating meaning and appearance of the object. This ambiguous 
approach to being gives way to a more accurate portrayal of reality, which is itself unstable. 
 The complexity of reality is especially visible in the intersection of my various 
experiences and acquired meanings with those of the other. My perception of the world thus 
becomes imbued with new and often conflicting meanings. If I am to allow for the possibility of 
an indeterminate world, then I need to understand the world as constituted by more than my own 
consciousness. In order to accept a plurality of consciousnesses, I must conceive my 
consciousness as inherent in “its body and its world”: that is, my consciousness possesses a 
body, which then allows my consciousness to become a self. This done, I am then able to accept 
that other consciousnesses also inhabit other bodies (Merleau-Ponty 351). Thus, the other 
becomes not only a perceived object in space, but also an object possessing its own self, making 
intersubjectivity possible. As a self – as a consciousness with a body – the other can experience 
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the world as I do, but necessarily derives different meanings from those experiences: because the 
other is an other, a certain solipsism delimits my perception of the world, implying a perpetual 
difference between my experience and the other’s. The intersecting and engaging of my 
experiences and the other’s through communication merges our respective meanings, indicating 
a lived world more complex than I had originally perceived.  
 Merleau-Ponty requires the establishment of common ground for productive – that is, 
meaningful – communication. His common ground materializes in the potential for two 
individuals to share an experience – the significance is in the potential more than the literal 
sharing of an experience. Two strangers will almost definitely differ in the experiences that have 
shaped their selves, but Merleau-Ponty understands the very potentiality as necessary in creating 
a common ground.  Communication on common ground will be built on shared or near meanings 
and thoughts – expressed as speech – will be deemed intelligible by each individual. While the 
existence of infinite other selves seems to complicate the establishment of common ground, the 
prevalence of normative modes of thought increases the potential for shared meanings between 
two individuals. When one individual does not adhere to the norm, however, communication 
with the other becomes a challenge.   
 
II. Complicating Gender 
 As a result of the plurality of selves and unproductive communication, the “truth” of 
reality and its stability become uncertain. This project will dwell on the unstable reality of gender 
categories. The gender system of the Western world gets its meaning from a heteronormative 
binary. Based on the biologically sexed body, this binary recognizes two legitimate gender 
identities: female and male. Because the stability of Western reality depends on the gender 
 
 8 
binary, society enforces adherence to given norms – those phenomena that “represent the average 
or ideal towards which all other phenomena move” (Mary Poovey qtd. in Butler, Undoing 50). 
The imposition of normative behaviors creates a structure in which delinquent gender identities 
and performances are extremely apparent. The general term that stands for so-called gender 
delinquency is transgender. Judith Halberstam describes transgender as “a gender identity that is 
at least partially defined by transitivity” (161). Gender transitivity can emerge as the crossing or 
blending of gender categories, physical gender movement through surgery, or the movement 
away from binary boundaries. The transgender category includes transsexuals; cross dressers; 
androgynous, nonbinary, agender, and genderqueer individuals; and intersexed individuals. 
These all are gender experiences that subvert the traditional conception of a binary gender and 
thus threaten a stable Western reality. For this paper, I will use the term “nonbinary” to mean any 
gender identity that does not fall on the binary spectrum – thus, it will not include, for example, 
transgender individuals who identify as women or men.  
             In one way or another, these transgressive gender identities relate themselves back to the 
binary, as Kate Bornstein says of androgyny: “Androgyny assumes that there’s male stuff on one 
side of a spectrum and female stuff on another side of that spectrum. And somewhere in the 
middle of this straight line, there’s an ideal blend of ‘male’ and ‘female.’ However, by saying 
there’s a ‘middle,’ androgyny really keeps the opposites in place” (115). Androgyny – as well as 
male-to-female and female-to-male transsexuality – reifies the gender binary in its need of the 
spectrum for its definition. Although nonbinary identities dislocate themselves from the binary 
continuum in a way that other transgender identities do not, they too require the existence of that 
continuum: without a gender binary, “nonbinary” would be meaningless. Does nonbinary also 
reify the gender binary? Certainly, the existence of identities that refuse the female and male 
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classifications poses the possibility that the gender binary is in fact unreal. At the same time the 
necessary acknowledgement of these classifications allows the gender binary continued 
existence, if only as a social construction.  
            While the nonbinary identity recognizes the reality of the binary (and its consequences), 
it nonetheless complicates the validity of the Western ideal of gender. As with all transgender 
identities, nonbinary does not follow a predetermined gender narrative; indeed, its very 
divergence from the binary suggests that the nonbinary experience is not mappable at all. Much 
of the binary system is built on the assumption that gender naturally follows from primary sex 
characteristics and thereafter remains immutable. In some cases, the sexual surface is ambiguous, 
as is the case with some intersexed individuals. Such unintelligible bodies are punished – 
through surgery or physical violence – in an attempt to emphasize the significance of the body in 
assigning gender, which, in turn, plays a critical role in social organization.  
 For Sigmund Freud the reality of the intersexed body confounds the link between the 
visible sexual surface and the medical “truth” of physiology: where a sexual configuration does 
not adhere to binary expectations – and, moreover, the explicitly established expectations of the 
medical complex – “truth" becomes an unstable construct (7). The same confounding might be 
seen in the link between a nonbinary gender performance and the “truth” of the binary matrix. A 
gendered performance is first perceived at the surface of the body: the visual image presents 
itself before other aspects of the perceptual object become known. This initial image can be read 
– by the binary other – as situated within the binary matrix. Assigning a binary gender based on 
an indeterminate performance may be a struggle for the binary other, but because the hegemonic 
matrix constricts its subjects, binary readings seem to be the only feasible option. However, this 
other will still recognize the incoherence in the nonbinary performance, and such a performance 
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pushes “us up against the limits of gendered representation: the limits of what about gender we 
can consign to representation, of what we can process as identity in the visual” (Prosser 223). 
Faced with a performance that exceeds these limits, the binary other is either deeply disturbed or 
compelled to reevaluate their conception of “truth.” 
 Gender ambiguity causes “loss of cognitive orientation” in the binary other: “People will 
regard any phenomenon that produces this disorientation as ‘disgusting’ or ‘dirty.’ To be so 
regarded, however, the phenomenon must threaten to destroy not only one of their fundamental 
cognitive categories but their whole cognitive system” (Murray S. Davis qtd. in Bornstein 72). 
The binary cognitive system depends on the matrix that determines the templates for social 
interactions, such as in business, academic, or romantic relationships. When presented with a 
non-normative gendered being, the binary other has the option to reject or incorporate the 
perceived meanings into their understanding of the world; the cognitive disorientation, however, 
often causes a fear or discomfort that impedes acceptance. The cognitive orientation established 
by a stable gender system hinges on the exclusivity of binary categories; thus the very possibility 
of nonbinary identities disrupts the promise of security – hence the violent retribution many 
gender transgressors face. 
 
III. Perceiving the Nonbinary 
 As a tool for understanding perception, phenomenology allows for a critical examination 
of what creates gender in the social mind. The pursuit of meaning in the nonbinary being with an 
ambiguous approach to perception precludes the possibility of a definitive “truth.” By accepting 
the possibility of an indeterminate gendered being, the phenomenologist can investigate the signs 
that inform our understanding of gender while critically aware of the presupposed facticity of the 
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binary system. The perceived indeterminate being will not, therefore, be limited by unreflective 
conceptions; the unending search for meaning in the nonbinary being leads to an blended image 
whose very incoherence suggests that binary gendered signs do not have an definitive basis. 
Thus the investigation of nonbinary reveals the tenuous stability of the binary gender system. 
 Transcending the limitations of modern perception opens up an exploration of nonbinary 
identities at their points of contact with the binary matrix. Identifiable conflicts or disruptions 
highlight the constructedness of gender: gender identities that violate the binary have the ability 
to elicit conflict because they represent a threat to the power structure defined by the binary 
matrix. The enforcement of the gender binary is always in the service of established power 
structures: not only does it maintain the male/female hierarchy but it also delimits the gendered 
norms that determine the shape of those structures (Whittle 210). The reality of gendered beings 
existing outside the binary delegitimizes the regulatory mechanism that establishes the “natural 
truth” of those hierarchies.  
 Chapter Two will utilize Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of ambiguous perception to 
investigate the incoherent nonbinary selves depicted in a collection of personal essays. Gender 
Failure – originally a spoken word performance – portrays the nonbinary lives of Rae Spoon and 
Ivan Coyote. The memoirs that make up Gender Failure offer an intimate glimpse into the 
subjective and intersubjective experiences of the binary world. Tracing the points of contact 
between the nonbinary existences of the authors and the binary matrix demonstrates the 
difficulty of living an authentic nonbinary life within that matrix. Even as they reveal the 
instability of the binary, Spoon and Coyote's narratives emphasize the constriction of norms and 
expectations that precipitate illegible gender performances.  
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 A phenomenology of perception begins to approach the origins of gender: by dismantling 
the immutability of the binary, the phenomenologist can locate the signs that inform readings of 
gendered bodies and ultimately recognize how those signs reinforce the hierarchal power 
structure. In order to understand the extent of Spoon and Coyote’s supposed gender delinquency, 
Merleau-Ponty’s ambiguous perception must take into account the intersubjectivity of identity 
formation. In order for the nonbinary self to understand and define their identity, they require the 
binary other’s perception of and subsequent reading of their body: the other’s interpretation will 
mark the nonbinary body as nonconforming, a classification that determines the nonbinary self’s 
situation in and experience of the external world. Just as my reading of the other brings them into 
being for me, I come into being for the other: embodiment is always intersubjective (Salamon 
46). 
 Merleau-Ponty’s focus on intersubjectivity implies that the two individuals have the 
ability to establish common ground: that self and other share or could share similar 
interpretations of signs and objects. However, in the case of the meeting of nonbinary and binary 
individuals, common ground cannot be located because the binary other – having never 
experienced the binary from outside – will not be able to comprehend the reality of the nonbinary 
experience. This obstacle is further complicated by the language barrier present in the nonbinary 
self’s articulation; because the language used by the nonbinary self originates from within the 
binary, binary others will always overlay the self’s words with their own meanings. Thus, there 
is incommensurability in the interactions between nonbinary self and binary other. This division 
necessarily implies an insufficient empathy in such interactions; this means the binary other 
possesses a fragmented understanding of the nonbinary existence such that, even when the other 
allows that existence, the nonbinary self’s ultimate illegibility precludes its validity in terms of 
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the gender binary. The aim of this project is to demonstrate the social isolation of the nonbinary 
existence in terms of its illegibility – as seen in Gender Failure – while also proposing means for 
making space for such existences within the binary matrix.   
  
 
About pronouns: Because of their position outside the gender binary, nonbinary individuals 
frequently prefer personal pronouns that reflect that position. Gender-neutral pronouns range 
from the familiar (they/them/theirs) to the unfamiliar (zi/zir/zirs). To avoid confusion – and 
because Spoon and Coyote have explicitly stated their preferences – I will use the third-person 
singular pronoun “they” when speaking about nonbinary individuals. However, “they” will also 
be used in its traditional binary – singular and plural – forms in this paper; to the best of my 
ability (given the constraints of language) I will make it clear what “they” refers to.  
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Chapter One 
How Do You Tell the Truth?: Constructing a Nonbinary Self in a Binary World 
 To live as nonbinary – without and against the gender binary – the self must negotiate a 
social system that seeks to delegitimize its existence. Performing and articulating an 
unauthorized gender in a system structured by fixed binary meanings implies a necessary 
revision of perceptual mechanisms. The nonbinary self – itself filtered through hegemonic modes 
of thought – faces perpetual erasure of its reality by the binary other’s interpretation of their 
gendered performance: in being offered up to an alien gaze, the body risks being stolen from its 
reality (Merleau-Ponty 167). When the nonbinary self performs an identity that appears 
delinquent in regulatory social contexts, the other does not recognize an intelligible being; 
consequently, the self becomes marked as less than human – a being denied personhood.  
 The unintelligibility between self and other arises from dissonant meanings. Because the 
nonbinary self moves within a heteronormative binary matrix, its intentions oppose the available 
meanings with which the other perceives the world. This incommensurable relationship leaves 
the self at risk of unintelligibility: the nonbinary self necessarily relies on binary signs for its 
performance, precipitating the attribution of binary meanings. Thus the structure of the gender 
binary invalidates the reality of the nonbinary. The binary other experiences the world according 
to fixed gender norms instituted by a regulatory apparatus. Its instinct to look for normativity in a 
gendered performance supports the goals of such an apparatus – namely, to produce the image of 
a stable gendered “truth.”   
 In social encounters, the initial visual perception is the site of contact between self and 
other, and the product of that perceptive act lays the foundation for the self’s potential 
intelligibility. Gender expression, in the form of bodily cues and signs, inform the other’s 
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reading, which precedes the constitution of a unified being. In the first moments of an 
interaction, the observer will instinctively seek out the gender of the self: establishing this 
identity categorization is crucial for determining how to understand and behave toward a social 
object, and failing to comprehend it causes extreme discomfort in the observer (Crawley et al 
37). Without the rubric of binary gender, the regulatory script of social interactions falls away 
and the immutable “truth” of gender, the persistence of which allows for an exclusive category of 
“personhood,” becomes destabilized.  
 Socially sanctioned gender performances – and the successful execution thereof – 
delineate the criteria for personhood. Consequently the conceptual “person” is constituted by the 
very apparatus that imposes a stable binary; Judith Butler asks: “To what extent do regulatory 
practices of gender formation and division constitute identity, the internal coherence of the 
subject, indeed, the self-identical status of the person? [...] And how do the regulatory practices 
that govern gender also govern culturally intelligible notions of identity?” In other words, when 
“identity” is assured through stabilizing concepts, “the person” is called into question by 
incoherent or discontinuous gendered beings “who appear to be persons but who fail to conform 
to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined” (Butler, Gender 
Trouble 23).   
 The nonbinary self threatens the legitimacy of the gender binary: indeed, the very 
existence of this self precludes the stability of the binary. When regulatory practices are rejected 
and the nonbinary reality disrupts “the regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence, it seems that 
the expressive model loses its descriptive force. That regulatory ideal is then exposed as a norm 
and a fiction that disguises itself as a developmental law regulating the sexual field that it 
purports to describe” (Butler, Gender 185). The revelation of this fiction suggests that the notion 
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of the “person” and even reality itself has been constricted in service to the maintenance of a 
hierarchal power structure.  
 Restricted by this framework, the nonbinary self must actively construct itself as a viable 
person. To do this means addressing the perceptive act as normalized by the binary apparatus. 
The nonbinary self, aware of its inhuman status, presents its identifying self with a self-
consciousness not possessed by binary individuals. Thus it has the ability to alter and 
recontextualize binary meanings in its performance and articulation of self. Understanding the 
conduct of the nonbinary self facilitates a phenomenological investigation of gender as a system. 
Where the binary would have its subjects defined as determinate beings, following Merleau-
Ponty’s method of ambiguity urges the phenomenologist to seek out the infinite meanings that 
constitute the nonbinary self; as this perpetual process unfolds, the phenomenologist transcends 
the limitations set by the binary. Effecting this mode of perception allows a move toward the 
origins of gendered meanings, thereby expanding the conceptual reality and legitimizing the 
nonbinary existence.  
 
I. Where Does Gender Come From and What Does It Want? 
 Where gendered meanings derive from perception, the bodily surface of the other is the 
primary object; that object is the site of visual cues, the contexts of which inform our 
interpretation. The other – even before speaking – becomes a meaningful figure as a result of my 
reading of their body. Of all the cues I might find presented by the other, gendered attributes 
seem the most straightforward. In observing the other, I can pick out certain attributes – e.g. 
hairstyle, clothing, body language – that will tell me whether to gender the other as male or 
female. It may happen that the other presents a blend of gendered attributes; regardless, as a 
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subject of the binary matrix, I will categorize the other as either male or female, based on the 
meanings I already possess.  
 Consider this example: While grocery shopping, I observe an individual of middling 
height, with long electric pink hair and a beard, wearing makeup and Carhartts, and walking in a 
way that evinces femininity. The gendered attributes that appear at the surface of this body 
conflict with one another, resisting my initial effort to categorize. The presence of the beard 
however, strongly suggests a particular genetic makeup, and so declares the ‘real’ gender of this 
individual. The binary instinct to equate gender with sex prioritizes visible sex characteristics in 
the act of assigning a gender. This process often leads to misreadings of gender performances, 
which are the result of the “negotiation between the individual’s gender identity and the 
limitations of the socially sanctioned binary sexes and gender” (Davidmann 197).  
 According to Western society, socially sanctioned gender identities proceed from the 
biological “fact” of sex. Two primary approaches to understanding of gender are based on this 
correlation: essentialism and social constructionism. Gender essentialism maintains “that men 
and women have inherent, unique, and natural attributes that qualify them as their separate 
genders” (Jakubowski). In this framework, then, gender equals sex: gendered identities and 
characteristics are predetermined by biology, and because the sexed body apparently can only 
take one of two forms – either naturally or surgically – this necessarily means that only two 
genders exist. Thus the existence of a binary implies that gender mirrors sex or is in some way 
restricted by it (Butler, Gender 9):3 when sex determines gender, nonbinary identities are an 
impossibility. These identities deviate from nature in their presentation, but, according to gender 
                                                
3 Sex itself can be categorized as a socially constructed binary, as exemplified in the coerced 
surgical reconstruction of an intersexed newborn’s genitalia. See Butler, Gender 59-67. 
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essentialism, such an identity still is actually binary: one only needs to look close enough to 
determine the “truth” of the body to reveal the gender (Kessler and McKenna).4  
 The binary matrix embodies this understanding of gender: in order to enforce binary 
genders, a regulatory apparatus would require the conception of a “natural” gender for the 
denotation of “normal.” The reliance on anatomical or chromosomal sex to define “normal” 
suggests that gender is an immutable category, thereby restricting the range of acceptable human 
experience. However, the reality of gender transgressors demonstrates that the physical body is 
not the “actual” source or indicator of gender.  
 Social constructionism finds that source in the social forces that contribute to the 
collective conception of “normal.” In this model, gender is not considered an essential and 
biological quality – although membership in arbitrary gender categories is, as it happens, 
determined by the configuration of sexed bodies. Butler, a social constructionist, considers 
gender “the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid 
regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort 
of being” (Gender 45). A “typical” gendered body – “a natural sort of being” – emerges from the 
regulating forces of the external social world. These forces manifest as gender norms, the ideals 
that delineate socially acceptable gendered presentations and behaviors. Gender norms are not 
just laws but ways of knowing, modes of truth that forcibly define intelligibility (Butler, Undoing 
57). The nonbinary self visibly flouts regulatory norms, so generating their unintelligible gender 
identity and their apparent challenging of the binary and the power it represents.  
                                                
4 Gender essentialism could be said to allow for transsexuals, provided the body is surgically 
altered to become the “right” sex. Even so, individuals whose identity presentation includes 
physical alteration subvert the idea of an intrinsic relationship between gender and sex.  
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 Compliance with and enforcement of the norms that define “normal” is always in the 
service of an established power structure: for example, compulsory gendering within the 
male/female dynamic perpetuates the apparent supremacy of men over women (Whittle 210). As 
a binary system, Western society is built on such sets of either/or dynamics, the construction of 
which implies that the first value possesses a “primary” status. The efficacy of this hierarchal 
system cannot withstand a third – or fourth, or fifth – quantity; a social trinary would not have 
the legitimate organizational power inherent in a binary because the supremacy marking the 
higher value would necessarily lose its potency as more values are added to the equation. This 
means nonbinary identities cannot be recognized by a system that acquires its authority from a 
binary hierarchy.   
 Thus binary norms are strictly enforced. Individuals who do not perform a gender 
according to socially sanctioned norms are punished, psychically and/or physically. Butler 
believes that those who violently reinforce the binary have some stake in the immutability of 
gender categories: “If a person opposes norms of binary gender not just by having a critical point 
of view about them, but by incorporating norms critically, and that stylized opposition is legible, 
then it seems that violence emerges precisely as the demand to undo that legibility” (35). In other 
words, if the nonbinary performance is in fact legible – if the binary other recognizes it as a 
gender identity – then that very legibility signals the fictitiousness of a stable gender system. 
Again, the revelation of that fictitious nature threatens the security that an immutable truth 
affords – policing and violence serve as tools for maintaining the “truth.”  
 The essentialist and constructionist approaches to gender, however, do not accurately 
define the origins of gender on their own. If gender essentialism were the rule, transgender 
identities of any kind would not exist; likewise, if gender proceeded solely from social 
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construction, the only genders would be those that adhered to sanctioned norms. As biologist 
Julia Serano asks, “[If] socialization artificially brainwashes all of us into becoming heterosexual 
masculine men and feminine women, then how do you explain the existence of fabulous bisexual 
femme-tomboy transsexual women such as myself?” (qtd. in Jakubowski). The answer must then 
be that gender is a product of both an inborn essence and external social forces. While the degree 
of each influence depends on the individual, both contribute to the gendering of the self (ibid.).  
Nonbinary identities exemplify this model: they arise independently of biological sex and, as 
Serano quips, social construction clearly cannot and does not condition all gendered selves. As 
the paragon of this gendering process, nonbinary serves as evidence that both essentialism and 
constructionism limit the reality of gender experiences.  
 Regulatory norms, proceeding from gender essentialism or constructionism, impose “a 
model of coherent gendered life that demeans the complex ways in which gendered lives are 
crafted and lived” (Butler, Undoing 5). Gendered beings do not possess a “core” gender identity 
that directs their existence; nor do they exist only in terms of social regulation. Both possibilities 
ignore the reality of complex gender experiences: despite the efforts of the binary matrix, non-
normative gender identities abound. Due to compulsive adherence to hegemonic expectations 
and performance of heteronormative gendered acts, the full breadth of human experience 
remains unexplored. The repetition of socially sanctioned, regulatory gender acts – which are 
then legible as either female or male – legitimizes those acts as normative; thus exact repetition 
of those acts is required for a self to be granted personhood. However, because acts are repeated 
across time and contexts, gender necessarily becomes an unstable identity, subject to 
resignification and non-normative repetitions (Butler, Trouble 188). The non-normative 
repetitions of the nonbinary self reveal the “truth” represented by the gender binary to be 
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baseless: by merely having the ability to challenge the “truth” of the binary, the nonbinary self 
demonstrates the legitimacy of their gender identity.  
 
II. Binary Perception and Nonbinary Illegibility 
 I experience the world with a sensual awareness: my body encounters sights, sounds, and 
smells that construct it as a perceiving and perceived being. The accumulation of such 
encounters brings together a world that begins to define my self. I cannot deliberately construct 
this world as an extension of myself; instead, it serves as a permanent background against which 
I perceive objects and am perceived (Merleau-Ponty xvii). The perceptive act is not merely the 
sensual awareness of the world around me, but also the product of the unconscious acquisition 
and synthesis of meaning based on my direct experience with that world in the very moment that 
I experience it. Through sight, sounds, and spatial and temporal experiences, lived as I move 
throughout the world, my consciousness assembles meanings that reconstruct my objective body 
into a subjective being.  
 The meanings I draw upon for perception stem from two basic sources. First, from my 
individual meanings, which are subjective and acquired from my direct experience of the world. 
Although some experiences, and therefore their meanings, are in some way universal, the self’s 
consciousness interprets them in a way that renders them unique to the individual. For example, 
when I experience a color called “red,” my consciousness perceives that color and assigns a 
meaning to the phenomenon of redness; these meanings will be associated with my visual 
perception of the color itself, but may also include the (socially-informed) feelings of red (e.g. 
love, anger, heat, etc.). Thereafter, I will experience redness as a product of the meanings I 
already possess. However, although redness is a universal experience, my meanings will be 
 
 22 
vastly different from those of, say, a blind individual: “red” is still experienced by both our 
consciousnesses, but I cannot say that the other shares my meaning.  
 Alternately, imposed meanings (as by a regulatory apparatus) dictate the meaning one 
should read in a given sign; this establishes the conditions under which a given experience of a 
sign is considered “correct.” For most, such prescribed meanings come naturally and so their 
perception of the world meets the expectations of the regulatory apparatus. In this context 
meanings are understood as universally shared, such that deviations are obvious. Nonconforming 
meanings, then, inform perceptions and experiences of the world that threaten “truth” and its 
promise of stability. For example, using the binary matrix as a benchmark, meanings that deviate 
from this norm – i.e. those that define the nonbinary self – produce an experience of the world 
that reveals a precarious binary reality. The rejection of these socially imposed meanings marks 
the nonbinary self and its experience of the world as delinquent.  
 The above forms of meaning render the world as I perceive and experience it subject to 
my existence as a discrete self. The discreteness of my self – and thereby of the other, who 
possesses their own discrete self – complicates the perceptive act. The distinction between self 
and other constitutes the asymmetry that characterizes the intersubjectivity of perception. While 
the possibility of a common ground is essential in perceiving accurate meaning in the other’s 
language, it is also crucial in perceiving an intelligible being in the other’s performance of self. 
The other comes into being for me in the attribution of my “ready-made” meanings; just as the 
other can only speak to me in a language I already understand, so too can the other only 
physically articulate their self with a body I find legible. This legibility depends on 
commensurate meanings. Because of the inherent individuality of the subjective self, comparable 
meanings shared with the other cannot be guaranteed. However, when experiences and meanings 
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originate in a regulatory apparatus – the gender binary, for example – bodies are more likely to 
be legible.  
 In terms of an indeterminate phenomenology, achieving legibility may be complicated by 
the perpetual perceptive act. The indeterminate being presupposed by Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy of ambiguity is composed of infinite profiles, and the other that is immediately 
available for me is always only seen in the act of seeing them. There are always unseen aspects 
of the other and to attempt to perceive them as a whole is a futile task; thus my perception of the 
other is never accurate. However, the other does not appear to me as a complete unknown: I 
perceive the other as a coherent whole through a synthesis of retained and anticipated profiles 
(Detmer 103). The very coherence of these profiles confirms the legibility of the other. This 
process, though, only succeeds when the anticipated profiles align with what is already known: 
the binary other cannot anticipate the unseen profiles of the nonbinary self – including gender 
identity and gender history – because that anticipation presupposes a universal binary 
experience. Thus the various aspects of the nonbinary self cannot cohere in the binary other’s 
perception, revealing an unintelligible being.  
 As a result of this binary perception, the nonbinary self experiences the world as an 
apparently incoherent being. They understand that the binary other cannot find meaning in their 
existence – or, to be more precise, the meaning the binary other does find creates the image of a 
delinquent binary self. The other’s perception of the self is the foundational act in constituting a 
social being. In intersubjective encounters, the initial impulse is to look for information in the 
body of the other, or bring into play information already possessed. This information “helps to 
define the situation, enabling others to know in advance what he will expect of them and what 
they may expect of him. Informed in these ways, the others will know how best to act in order to 
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call forth a desired response from him” (Goffman 1).5 My appearance, attitude, and language 
will become meaningful for the other based on their past experiences. The self they perceive in 
my performance is therefore subject to the meanings they already possess, which may or may not 
produce an accurate representation.  
 The information the other finds in their initial perception of my body determines how our 
encounter will unfold. Sociologist Erving Goffman’s model shows the significance of that first 
image: every aspect of my interaction with the other will be defined according to their perception 
of me. In a split second and a cursory glance, I have become a self in the eyes of the other. 
Whether that self is an accurate representation of my identity depends on the origin of their 
individual meanings. The other’s subsequent behavior toward me will demonstrate not only the 
signs they read on my body but also the meanings that have already been ascribed to them. The 
body I present for the other’s perception is an embodied articulation of the self I understand 
myself to be. As this embodied self, I learn how to interact with the world around me in a way 
that is authentic to my identity. The other’s response to my performance relays a second image 
of my self: I see in their behavior toward me my self as they perceive it. Confronted with the 
image, I am dislocated from my solipsistic existence and the coherent perception I had of my self 
must be adjusted. The legibility of my social self is always contingent on the other’s gaze.  
 Intelligibility derived from the perceptive process depends on established meanings, 
especially those that have been set by a regulatory apparatus. The nonbinary self upsets this 
framework: operating from outside these limiting boundaries, the nonbinary self presents a body 
that defies binary readings. The resulting perception is an amalgamation of nonbinary identity 
and binary meanings. This incoherent being – and the reality of its existence – demonstrates the 
                                                
5 These are the pronouns used in Dr Goffman’s original text.  
 
 25 
extent of the constricting perceptive apparatus set by the binary. Thus perceptions from within 
the matrix threaten the nonbinary self: if their social performance is always read according to 
binary meanings, can a nonbinary self be considered legitimate? In order to encourage an 
accurate reading of their self, the nonbinary individual must take up the task of self-articulation.  
 
III. Articulating the Nonbinary Self 
 Self-articulation is the visual or verbal building-up of oneself with the aim of directing 
the other’s perception. Wearing a certain band t-shirt or claiming an identity label (e.g. queer, 
punk, athlete) are modes of self-articulation: each is meant to underscore parts of an individual’s 
identity in the eyes of the other. Articulation assumes that the self the other reads in my 
performance is inaccurate, such that I must provide additional signs in the hope that the other 
will attribute a meaning that meets my intention. The project of self-articulation aims to present a 
self’s truth in a way that the other understands it as true-for-me. Making the truth understandable 
depends on how you tell the truth. The truth needs to be communicated or performed in such a 
way that the culture can hear it (Bornstein 95). When the culture cannot hear the truth – when the 
culture’s sanctioned vocabulary limits reality – self-articulation struggles for validation.  
 Articulation is especially important for nonbinary individuals seeking understanding 
within the binary matrix. The limiting binary framework the nonbinary self comes up against 
affords little space for an articulation of an atypical existence. Butler’s assessment of this 
framework suggests that it not only limits reality but also the imagined reality:  
The limits of the discursive analysis of gender presuppose and preempt the 
possibilities of imaginable and realizable gender configurations within culture. [...] 
These limits are always set within the terms of a hegemonic cultural discourse 
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predicated on binary structures that appear as the language of universal rationality. 
Constraint is thus built into what that language constitutes as the imaginable 
domain of gender. (Gender 12)  
Thus nonbinary as a category has neither the space nor even the vocabulary to articulate itself as 
a viable style of existence. Because the hegemonic discourse is “predicated on binary structures,” 
the available tools for nonbinary articulation are always already imbued with binary meanings. 
When established by fixed meanings, language, as the system for delimiting conceptual 
categories, constricts feasible reality: as an unimaginable identity category, nonbinary struggles 
to be articulated in a way that demonstrates its legitimacy.  
 Meant to be an act of agency, articulation challenges the nonbinary self to forcibly make 
space for their existence. The visual and verbal articulation directs the other to perceive the 
presented self according to the self’s intentions. In doing so, the other is expected to attribute 
meanings to the body toward an accurate perception of the self. Although the self has greater 
influence over the other in the project of articulation, they still cannot dictate the meanings that 
the other reads in the body. For the nonbinary self, the visual and verbal signs available for 
articulation already contain meaning for the binary other. This puts the nonbinary self in the 
position of speaking from a non-space, using a language that belongs to someone else.  
 Validation of personhood proceeds from self-articulation; consequently the nonbinary 
self has a lot at stake in a successful articulation. The other’s perception determines how the 
nonbinary self is perceived as a social being; but the intersubjective constitution of self means 
that the other also has a role in determining how one perceives their selfhood and therefore how 
they experience the world: the binary other’s perception influences both the self-as-perceived 
and the self-as-lived. Thus a successful articulation of self – and the subsequent validation of 
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personhood – depends on the other: the social self cannot exist without external input. If they 
cannot persuade the other towards an accurate reading of their performance, the nonbinary self 
faces unviability.  
 The nonbinary self has two means for self-articulation: the presentation of their body, and 
their use of language. As the initial site of perceptive contact, the body serves as the principal 
mode of self-articulation. The body is the means for performing the self, and we perform the self 
we believe ourselves to be; however, that is not always the self that the other perceives (Salamon 
3). The fundamental image of the self produces signs onto which the other will assign their own 
meanings: these meanings, unique to the other, almost never afford an accurate representation of 
the self. In a social setting, the immediately visible gender presentation – as opposed to the 
reality of chromosomal makeup, anatomical sex, or gender history – is impossible to ignore 
(Kessler and McKenna). Gendering the other always precedes the perception of a unified being. 
The normative behaviors that delineate the binary identity seem to be “natural” as a result of 
social construction; thus the constitution of the binary gender performance lacks the self-
consciousness that the nonbinary performance requires. The nonbinary self is always aware of 
the significance of that initial perception: if the body does not appear legible, the validity of the 
nonbinary identity is already at risk.   
 Physical articulation is limited by the visible body and marked by normative gender 
characteristics such as clothing, hairstyle, and body language. Ostensibly, the individual has 
control over the presentation of these elements; however, as a social object, the perception of the 
other ultimately delineates the self. Butler calls these conditions a “lively paradox,” an existence 
where “my body is and is not mine” (Undoing 21). For example, a nonbinary individual who 
presents their body in a certain way – self-consciously constructing its appearance and the way it 
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moves – intends for it to serve as a visual representation of their self; the binary other, however, 
will read in that same body a self that is in some way binary, perhaps a woman who presents an 
androgynous body. Regardless of the self's agency in its bodily articulation, the other will always 
tend towards its own intentions. Caught between identity and the binary matrix, the nonbinary 
self struggles toward an accurate projection of that self.  
 While bodily articulation is a significant element in the establishment of an accurately 
perceived self, the nonbinary individual also relies on linguistic tools. In verbal communication, 
“the meaning swallows up the signs”; that is, thought, as expressed by speech, becomes lost in 
the meanings it represents. These signs, which a consciousness takes in, can only take shape 
through “already available meanings” (Merleau-Ponty 183-4). In other words, verbal 
communication is an automatic task in which meanings are uncritically attached to signifying 
speech. In the project of articulation, the nonbinary self understands that the meaning ascribed to 
expressed thought always has binary origins. The language the nonbinary self uses to situate 
their identity is consequently already familiar to the binary other; because that is the case, the 
other instinctively calls up their ready-made meanings, overwriting those that the nonbinary self 
intends.  
 Self-definition as a linguistic act attaches meanings to the verbal expression of thought, 
defining the self according to the available linguistic context. For the Western world, the context 
is absolutely binary. As a result, expressed thoughts are always interpreted on the binary’s terms. 
For the nonbinary self, self-definition means defining “that which escapes language through the 
use of language itself” (Salamon 83). Dialogue with the other establishes a common ground – 
through the sharing of thoughts and resultant merging of perspectives – that makes 
communication possible. In conversation between nonbinary self and the binary other, though, 
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there is always a discrepancy in styles of thought and perception such that any ground reached 
will necessarily be uneven. The nonbinary self that one articulates cannot materialize if the styles 
of thought are not shared; in other words, the binary other cannot comprehend the nonbinary self 
because their consciousness always thinks according to the binary.  
 Constrained in this way, articulation seems to do little more than invalidate the nonbinary 
self. The use of binary tools would suggest that, at least linguistically, nonbinary is not a 
legitimate conceptual category. Without a designated vocabulary, the nonbinary self must rely on 
the language of a system that seeks to erase its existence. However, the nonbinary use of binary 
tools does not necessarily represent concession; in fact, this critical recontextualization 
destabilizes a supposedly immutable framework. Articulation of a gender-displaced existence 
breaks down the boundaries that limit imaginable genders: the articulation and performance of a 
gender by one who does not conform to binary expectations deploys and redistributes binary 
terms, and that redistribution disrupts and proliferates those terms outside the binary itself 
(Butler Gender 32). By proliferating and recontexualizing binary tools, nonbinary articulation 
reveals the arbitrary construction of the binary system: though the signified meanings belong to a 
discourse that preempts the reality of non-normative genders, the deliberate shifting of the signs 
outside the binary as a means for articulation suggests that their meanings have a flexibility not 
sanctioned by the regulatory binary apparatus.  
 As a means of building-up the self, articulation has the potential to direct the other toward 
an accurate perception of a performed identity. For the nonbinary individual, self-articulation 
allows for agency in the face of the other's gaze. In deliberately constructing their physical 
appearance, the nonbinary self can control the signs available on their body; by critically 
utilizing language and the nonbinary self can persuade the other toward an accurate reading of 
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those signs. Both methods serve as critical measures in the realization of the self. However, 
operating within a binary world means that there are plenty of opportunities for the nonbinary 
self to be misunderstood. Recognizing the difficulty in articulating the nonbinary self is crucial 
for understanding the conceptual incommensurability between nonbinary self and binary other. 
 
IV. Locating the Nonbinary “I” 
 The project of self-articulation aims to provide an accurate representation of the self; in 
doing so, the other may be directed toward the self’s performative intentions. The subjective 
pronoun of self-articulation is “I”: using the linguistic construction “I am,” the self establishes a 
conceptual image of their identity. Philosopher George Herbert Mead suggests that the “I” 
cannot be an object of consciousness: although it informs the articulated identity, the nonbinary 
“I” is not an attainable concept itself. Where, then, does the “I” come from, and how does it 
translate to a performed self?  
 In “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness,” Mead differentiates between the “me” and 
the “I” of the self, where “me” is the social projection and “I” is the essential self. This “me” 
stands for the embodied consciousness that interacts with the world. Its building-up is 
intersubjective: the possibility of a verbal gesture affecting the self as it does the other serves as 
the essential foundation of “me” (140). Mead’s conception of “me” therefore depends on 
Merleau-Ponty’s common ground. Where common ground cannot be attained – as between 
nonbinary and binary selves – the viability of “me” becomes threatened. If my “me,” as a social 
object, cannot be perceived as an intelligible binary being, the other will overwrite the reality of 
my nonbinary self. “Me” only comes into existence by way of the other’s reading of my 
performed self: it is always uncertain, subject to the imposition of binary meanings.   
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 Mead’s “I,” then, is the unseen and unknowable essence that constructs “me.” “I” is 
always out of the reach of my consciousness; instead, the very existence of the “me” implies the 
existence of an “I.” Mead likens the “I” to Kant’s transcendental inner self: that is, the “inner 
sense” which creates a consciousness of “oneself only as one appears to oneself, not as one is” 
(Mead 141; Brook).6  The “I” is what one is, the governing essential self that produces “me”: 
thus “me,” is always only a near representation of “I.” As the embodied consciousness, my “me” 
(the self I understand myself to be and that I present to the world) is not me (my essential self) 
but rather the constructed image based on the social experiences filtered through that essential 
self (“I”). Experiences of the world – including the influence of social regulatory practices – 
inform the “I,” which in turn establishes the performance of the “me.”  
 Butler also conceives the “I” as an unconscious entity constructed by external forces, 
although she does not see a distinction between it and the “me.” She suggests that “the 
possibility of my persistence as an ‘I’ depends upon my being able to do something with what is 
done with me” (Undoing 3). In order to be a nonbinary “I” the self has to be able to do 
something with the ways they are done by norms and the other’s binary perceptions: the 
regulating practices evident in perception, self-articulation, and gender not only shape the self, 
but also the contingency of an “I.” In the binary matrix, the nonbinary self comes into being 
precisely because of what is done to the body. The intersubjective nature of perception constructs 
an othered self, which then encounters corrective pressures in the act of articulating and 
performing their self. Threatened by this framework, which seeks to erase the unintelligible, the 
“I” must “do something” with what has been done to it in the interest of its continuation.  
                                                
6 See Brook for further aspects of Kant’s consciousness and understanding of self.  
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 To be an “I,” then, requires that something be done with norms. The nonbinary self, 
though a product of regulating norms, also depends on norms for its existence; denying the 
reality of this constituting condition, however, cannot establish the “I.” Rather, the “I” that I am 
must endeavor “to live in ways that maintain a critical and transformative relation to [norms]” 
(Undoing 3). The very nonbinary identity embodies an acute self-consciousness as a result of its 
relation to the gender binary; thus the nonbinary self has the awareness to critically incorporate 
norms into their identity. The deliberate nature of this incorporation subverts the purpose of 
norms: where the binary apparatus seeks to construct homogeneous gendered beings, the critical 
nonbinary implementation of binary norms in fact represents a commentary on the 
constructedness and limited reality of sanctioned gender. In other words, the very manipulation 
of norms destablizes the fiction of stable gender identities. As a being that cannot “be without 
doing,” the nonbinary self becomes an “I” by doing norms critically (ibid).  
 This nonbinary realization necessarily meets resistance when conducted within the binary 
matrix. The “I,” Butler concludes, becomes “threatened with unviability, with becoming undone 
altogether, when it no longer incorporates the norm in such a way that makes this ‘I’ fully 
recognizable” (Undoing 3). Norms, though done critically, must also preserve familiarity for the 
binary other: the nonbinary self must take legibility as its goal in order to maintain a viable 
personhood. Because the constitution of self is intersubjective, nonbinary utilization of norms 
must accomplish intelligibility for the binary other. 
 The constrictive nature of the gender binary requires that the self perform an intelligible 
(binary) gender before personhood can be granted. Constructing such a performance often means 
the repression or erasure of the authentic identity. For some individuals, these conditions make 
life unlivable – even more so than not being recognized as human at all. Thus, the nonbinary self 
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may decide to distance itself from norms altogether rather than gain “a sense of intelligibility by 
virtue of norms that will only do [the self] in from another direction” (Butler, Undoing 3). Doing 
so may well make a sense of social belonging impossible, but the self will remain intact. This 
refusal of intelligibility too works as a critical “doing” of gender norms; even as the consequent 
nonbinary “I” precedes an unintelligible social “me,” the coherent self maintains its reality. 
Doing norms through incorporation or refusal establishes a nonbinary “I”; if the goal is 
personhood, though, the self must incorporate the limiting norms into an intelligible social 
projection.  
 A cohesive self contains two constituting entities: the “me” and the “I.” As the publically 
presented social object, “me” serves as the site of contact between nonbinary self and the binary 
world. The self it performs is an approximation of the identity contained in the “I.” Although 
always out of the reach on consciousness, “I” is shaped by both an “essential” self as well as the 
regulating forces of the social world. The difference between “me” and “I” is significant for its 
distinction between external and internal selves. My self For Others is always in the process of 
“doing” norms: for example, Butler says that gender is constantly being done for or with the 
other (Undoing 1). Because it is an intersubjectively constructed object, this external self is never 
completely my own. The internal self – the For Myself – is the locus of my “truth.” Although “I” 
is always being done by norms, it does not negotiate its own unity for intelligibility. Instead, the 
“I” – in order to persist as an “I” – must mediate its projected “me” to appear intelligible to the 
other.   
 
V. Conclusion 
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 The empathetic gap between nonbinary self and binary other does not arise 
spontaneously, but is actually the product of socially regulated norms that impose a limiting 
reality. These norms structure and reinforce conceptual categories that determine what is 
humanly possible (Crawley et al 87). Because the binary world does not allow space for what it 
considers “inhuman,” the nonbinary self must make the self-conscious effort to perform its 
identity – its internal “I” – in a way that the other can comprehend. However, without common 
ground, which Merleau-Ponty requires for meaningful communication, accurate perception may 
not be a possibility.  
 The nonbinary “I” has two primary challenges in achieving intelligibility for the binary 
other. The first is the perceptive act, which is the crucial site of recognition. As the other 
perceives the body of the self they unconsciously assign meanings to the signs they find there. 
However, because the meanings the other calls up are already located in the binary, the authentic 
identity of the perceived coherent self is overwritten, often with a delinquently gendered image. 
Behavior toward the self reflects this perception: such delinquency is often punished, either 
verbally or physically, in an effort to assert the immutability of the binary system. As the 
conceived self is constituted through intersubjectivity, the nonbinary self becomes conscious of 
its otherness, consequently perceiving and interacting with the world from the outside.  
 Because of this erasure of the nonbinary intentions, the self endeavors to articulate its 
identity in order to clearly portray its truth. Even with this act of agency, one cannot direct the 
binary other toward an accurate perception of the nonbinary self. Without the conceptual 
foundation afforded by shared meanings, the other is not able to approach the possibility of such 
a perception. The signs and tools available for self-articulation originate in the gender binary 
such that any interpretation of the nonbinary self is constrained by that system’s established 
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meanings. Thus the non-normative gendered performance of the nonbinary self marks it as 
unintelligible, rending it inhuman in the eyes of the binary other. In order to be granted 
personhood, nonbinary must take legibility as its performative goal.  
 All of this seems to suggest that nonbinary cannot exist as a legitimate social category. 
Certainly, the very construction of the gender binary preempts the possibility of dislocated 
identities. The nonbinary individual, as a subject in a binary social system, struggles to be 
perceived as an accurate representation of their self. Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna 
condense this dilemma when they wonder:  
Could a person with a transgendered identity translate [that identity] into a public 
transgendered attribution, where the attributor would say ‘That's neither a woman 
nor a man,’ rather than ‘I can't tell if that's a woman or a man’? To cultivate such 
an attribution in this third sense of transgender (beyond or through) is 
extraordinarily difficult and might be impossible. 
In its perception and articulation, the nonbinary self is always understood according to the 
gender binary; thus the “cultivation” of a context in which the other might naturally read a 
nonbinary body as neither/nor seems an impossibility. However, this does not mean that 
nonbinary is necessarily an illegitimate gender category. Recontextualizing binary signs and 
meanings serves as the nonbinary self’s entrance into a social world that denies its very 
imaginability. Nonbinary becomes a conceptual category precisely through its deliberate efforts 
to establish itself; for the binary matrix to consider it a legitimate reality, though, may well be 
impossible, as Kessler and McKenna suggest. The disparate conceptions of a possible reality, 
then, cement the incommensurable relationship between nonbinary self and binary other.   
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 As Butler suggests, narrowing that conceptual gap is not necessarily always the goal of 
the nonbinary self. If doing so means a devaluation of its reality, the self may choose to forego 
intelligibility. Such a performance makes the nonbinary experience one of perpetual negotiation 
and delegitimization. The experiences narrated in Gender Failure illustrate the possibilities of 
living as nonbinary in a limiting gender structure. Spoon and Coyote’s interactions with the 
world highlight their dislocation from the gender binary but also propose means for authentic 
nonbinary existence. A close reading of four aspects of their gender experiences – their 
relationships with their bodies, language, their sexualities, and the social world – suggest that 
nonbinary individuals perform their selves with a self-consciousness that secures their 
personhood within a world that marks their reality as an impossibility.   
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Chapter Two 
The Razor Edge of Accommodation: Violent Perception and the Nonbinary Body in Gender 
Failure 
 
 In our binary society, assigning a gender to others is an automatic and, ostensibly, 
necessary process: at first glance of a stranger, we use visual clues to categorize the other as 
either male or female. Our minds demand this gender categorization in order to perceive 
intelligibility in the other: because the binary matrix dictates social interactions, establishing 
gender roles and expectations is essential in relating to the other. Accepted gendered appearances 
and behaviors create a set of norms that influence our perception of the other and determine 
which gender to assign and, subsequently, how that gender assignment will affect interactions. 
This violent perceptive act necessarily superimposes the self’s own meanings over the other’s 
reality; potential violence plays out most evidently at the point of contact between the nonbinary 
self and the binary other. By definition, the nonbinary self lives external to the gender binary, 
identifying as neither male nor female, nor anywhere in between. Some nonbinary individuals 
claim the transgender label – one that can include any non-normative gender identity, such as 
transsexual, cross-dresser, and genderqueer – thereby orienting themselves in opposition to the 
norm. The nonbinary performance can take any form, but the binary other rarely perceives it 
accurately. 
 Nonbinary gender identities challenge the gendered truths and norms that govern the 
better part of social interactions; situated outside the binary matrix, the nonbinary identity refuses 
binary meanings, becoming a figure of unintelligibility for binary others. Thus, though the 
nonbinary gender experience varies by the extent to which individuals decide to socially and 
physically perform their identity, it has a substantial impact on the nonbinary individual’s 
relationship with the binary world around them. When a binary self perceives a nonbinary other, 
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binary truths are forcibly applied to make the nonbinary other legible (Butler, Undoing 57). 
Illegibility of the nonbinary gender experience occurs on multiple levels, most notably the 
physical body, language, and sociality. The struggle for – or resistance to – legibility 
characterizes the relationship between the nonbinary self and the binary world.  
 Due to their position within a binary matrix, the nonbinary self destabilizes the 
predominant experienced worldview and as such poses a threat to the security of binary 
categories. Binary gender categories define acceptable identities and offer a stable benchmark 
protected by norms. Established gender norms regulate the perception of gender, rendering the 
gendered body intelligible (Butler, Undoing 42); presumptions regarding the other’s perceived 
gender identity necessarily erase reality: if my experienced gender falls outside the binary and 
the other judges the perceived gender against a binary standard, my gender will be read as a 
(delinquent) binary identity.  
 In a phenomenological approach to social interactions, processes of performance and 
perception create a system wherein self and other arrive at different and often conflicting 
conclusions about identity. The observing self perceives the performance of the other and 
supplements the imperfect impression with anticipated profiles that stem from the self’s own 
modes of truth. The resultant synthesized image of the performing other cannot faithfully 
represent the reality of their existence, as the observing self cannot know the truths that define 
the other. Such a disparity necessarily occurs in all social interactions but the disparity is 
especially pronounced in the perceptive relationship between the nonbinary self and the external 
binary world. 
 An insurmountable gap divides the binary perception from the nonbinary experience. In a 
phenomenological framework, knowledge of the self – nonbinary or otherwise – is always 
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complete and knowledge of the other is always imperfect: as the self observes, aspects of the 
other remain hidden as a result of distinct consciousnesses. The self must literally experience the 
consciousness of the other in order to fully perceive the other’s existence (Merleau-Ponty 359). 
This gap necessarily forces the self to make presumptions about the nature of the other’s hidden 
reality, creating what Edmund Husserl calls a “world,” the quotation marks suggesting an 
imposed reality that is somehow less authentic than the actual reality (138). This causes a 
distortion between how the self identifies and how the other perceives that identity. The only 
constant is the experienced world, which exists subjectively to every individual’s position within 
it; thus it lacks conformity in how it affects its subjects. In other words, although the nonbinary 
self and binary other experience the same objective world, their subjective identities determine 
the meanings they will derive from it: where the other moves in the binary world with relative 
ease, the nonbinary self must make space for its identity within a normalizing gender matrix. 
 In the recent text adaptation of their live show Gender Failure, Ivan Coyote and Rae 
Spoon – two individuals assigned female at birth and who now use the singular pronoun “they” – 
address the everyday nonbinary experience through personal anecdotes extending from 
childhood to the present. These stories flesh out a gender narrative that resists categorization and 
familiarization. The nonbinary gender experience tends to alienate the individual owing to a 
social system that compulsively seeks to organize and stabilize threats to binary order; Coyote 
and Spoon expound on such alienation and thereby highlight the illegibility of the nonbinary 
experience for a binary other.   
 For individuals with incoherent gender presentations, the public restroom works as a site 
of contention with the binary world. Here, gender segregation reifies the gender binary and so 
gender presentations receive stringent scrutiny. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception 
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proves useful in considering nonbinary gender experiences with regards to the question of public 
restrooms. Binary perceptions pose a threat to the nonbinary self, who may face persecution 
based on their gender presentation; likewise, the binary self may feel threatened by the 
uncategorizable (and therefore dangerous) body of the nonbinary other. Bodily morphology 
rarely plays a role in public interactions, as it is not on display and therefore the other cannot 
perceive it; if morphology affects public life in any way, it is in the choice between gendered 
restrooms.  
 Coyote – who prefers to perform masculinity – uses public restrooms only as a last resort 
after having endured countless instances of harassment. Due to their anatomy – or perhaps 
because the other option presents a greater threat to their safety – Coyote chooses to use the 
women’s restroom when gender-neutral, single-stall facilities are unavailable (205). They know 
their gender presentation startles or even frightens women who perceive Coyote through a binary 
lens; as only two restroom options exist, so too must Coyote’s nonbinary self adhere to one of 
two accepted gender presentations. Coyote understands the fear their appearance elicits: women 
who support strictly segregated restrooms express concerns that men will use any leniency as a 
front for committing sexual violence (Benvenuto). Coyote’s own experiences, however, suggest 
that the nonbinary self cannot expect safety in the women’s restroom either: 
[E]very time a nice lady in her new pantsuit for travelling screams or stares at me, 
I try to remember that this is maybe her first encounter with someone who doesn’t 
appear to be much of a lady in the ladies’ room. [...] She doesn’t know I have 
been verbally harassed in women’s washrooms for years. She doesn’t know I 
have been hauled out with my pants still undone by security guards and smashed 
over the head with a giant handbag once. (206-7) 
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Although in general the nonbinary gender experience resists binary categorization, the use of 
public restrooms requires compliance. Coyote chooses the restroom based on their anatomical 
configuration; however, the binary other cannot perceive this aspect of Coyote’s existence – 
perceiving masculine gender attributes – misreads Coyote’s presence as a threat.  
 In the phenomenological framework, the body acts as one of the great sites of friction 
between the nonbinary self and the binary world. For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the body 
expresses existence at every moment, just as a word signifies thought (166). The nonbinary 
body, in its incoherence, signifies an existence that cannot be read as human by the binary other 
(Butler, Undoing 28). The inhuman nonbinary self threatens the safety and stability of the binary 
other, demonstrated by Coyote’s experiences in the extreme binary apparatus of the public 
restroom. Phenomenology provides a useful system for understanding the ways nonbinary 
identities challenge gender intelligibility.  
 The stage performance of Gender Failure toured internationally in 2012. With minimal 
staging, Spoon and Coyote occupy the center of the audience’s attention. This situation enables a 
transgression of gender norms at a micro level: the image of their physical bodies reifies the 
nonbinary experiences portrayed in their narratives, forcing their audience to reconcile Spoon 
and Coyote’s performances with “ready made” binary gendered meanings. The text reproduction 
transfers that ability, placing photos of the authors alongside personal essays. In both media, 
Spoon and Coyote control the discourse: the audience cannot escape the embodied reality of the 
nonbinary narratives they perceive and consequently struggle to overlay their binary truths onto 
the nonbinary other (James 2-4). The staging of the live performance as well as the creative 
control in publishing the book affords a significant ability to determine the delivery of their 
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words; despite the deliberate presentation of their identity, the gap between self and binary other 
remains insurmountable (Flegg).  
 A primary source of the illegibility of nonbinary genders stems from linguistic barriers: 
the binary matrix offers little space for the articulation of nonbinary existence without resorting 
to the use of binary language. As a result, nonbinary identities necessarily rely on the binary for 
articulation: even the term ‘nonbinary’ requires the existence of the binary for its meaning. 
Examining nonbinary genders from within a phenomenological framework reveals the 
indeterminacy of nonbinary realities that cannot be perceived by those who do not inhabit them: 
intelligibility may be attempted, but only on the terms of the binary matrix. Throughout Gender 
Failure, Spoon and Coyote strive to elucidate the nonbinary experience; but for an observing 
audience operating within the binary structure, perceptions of the performers’ gender will always 
derive intelligibility from binary meanings.  
 
I. Bodies and Embodiment 
 The body one feels oneself to inhabit is not necessarily the one the other perceives. 
Mannerisms, body language, dress codes, and any number of cosmetic modifications contribute 
to bodily performance; however, the meaning of the synthesized whole depends on the 
observer’s position in relation to the binary. In considering the body of the other the “very first of 
all cultural objects,” Merleau-Ponty asks how an object in space can render an existence legible 
(348-9). The body-as-object occupies a place in the field of perception; this field accrues social 
and cultural contexts that inscribe meaning onto the perceived object. However, the whole of the 
object can never be perceived in one moment; instead, the perceived whole is the result of the 
synthesis of retained and anticipated profiles of the object (Detmer 103). The anticipated profiles 
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are those informed by the perceptive field’s social and cultural contexts and the observer’s 
relation to them. Consequently, the meaning of these yet-to-be-seen aspects of the perceived 
body emerges from the observer’s preexisting meanings, overwriting the reality experienced by 
that body. The public body, therefore, is never quite only our own: through the body “gender and 
sexuality become exposed to others, implicated in social processes, inscribed by cultural norms, 
and apprehended in their social meanings” (Butler, Undoing 20). While the self assumes 
autonomy over how the body is presented for recognition, the social meaning of that 
performance necessarily depends on external forces.  
 The nonbinary body resists recognition by the binary other. Perceptions of the nonbinary 
body that originate from within the binary matrix strip the nonbinary self of the reality of their 
existence. As a cultural object, the body acts as the initial site of contact between the self and the 
perceiving other; this contact between the nonbinary body and binary perception creates a 
friction that destabilizes the gender binary. Judith Butler suggests that for those who depend on 
the boundaries of the gender binary for stability, the uncategorizable nonbinary body prompts a 
violent need to restore order (Undoing 34). Coyote experiences violent retaliation in public 
restrooms because of their apparently delinquent body. The violence enacted upon Spoon 
emerges from external social forces that manifest as self-harm. In both cases, the violence acts as 
a regulatory mechanism for maintaining the order set by the gender binary. The friction between 
the body of the nonbinary self and the external world begins for both Coyote and Spoon in 
childhood. In a set of chapters titled “Girl Failure,” the authors describe the ways their bodies 
resist binary expectations before their nonbinary gender identities are realized.  
 Coyote’s sense of ‘girl failure’ originates in the demise of a childhood friendship. In 
Janine, Coyote finds a friend who also loves sports and despises Barbies: a comrade in the 
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struggle against the traditional narrative of girlhood (22). Around the cataclysmic start of junior 
high, however, Coyote begins to feel distanced from Janine, who shows a budding interest in 
home ec and cheerleading. In retrospect, what Coyote sees as the culprit in this estrangement was 
the interposition of womanhood, which includes Janine’s devotion to cheerleading, her interest in 
boys, and her growing breasts (23). The moment that drives the decisive wedge between the two 
friends, Coyote says, is the slumber party. Rather than their traditional celebration of Janine’s 
birthday – movies and a bucket of fried chicken shared between the two of them – Janine throws 
a slumber party and invites her newer, more feminine friends in addition to Coyote. The party is 
unsurprisingly miserable, but it only gets worse after Coyote and the girls settle in to sleep: 
curled in the dark on their thin bedroll, Coyote overhears Janine telling her friends about 
Coyote’s genital configuration; although not technically intersexed, Coyote’s body is 
indeterminate enough that these preteen girls knew to categorize it as physically abnormal. They 
giggle and shriek words like ‘sick’ while Coyote feigns sleep (24). Rather than attempting to 
force binary legibility onto Coyote’s body, the girls instead create a third category in which 
Coyote is intelligible only as a deviation from the binary ideal, demonstrating the utility of the 
normal/abnormal (human/inhuman) binary in policing conformity to the gender binary.  
 Coyote marks this moment as the beginning of their fear of changing in front of others in 
public locker rooms: they use toilet stalls and they have “a scar on [their] elbow where [they] 
split it open on the rough edge of a toilet paper dispenser to prove it” (24). As a result of this first 
vocalized fear of their physical ambiguity, Coyote learned to accommodate the concerns of 
binary others in public spaces and experiences their own fear of physical and psychic pain in the 
process. Binary others perceive the world from within the binary matrix; Coyote’s body – both 
the indeterminate sexual surface and the illegible gendered body – does not adhere to a 
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sanctioned binary performance, triggering the urge to restore order. In some situations, such as 
public restrooms and locker rooms, Coyote has to take conscious steps to protect themself from 
the violence intended to maintain the gender binary. According to Butler, “the person who 
threatens violence proceeds from the anxious and rigid belief that a sense of world and a sense of 
self will be radically undermined if [the nonbinary body], uncategorizable, is permitted to live 
within the social world” (Undoing 34). The binary other’s anxiety stems from the possibility that 
the strict gender categories on which they depend for social meanings are unstable and, worse, 
unnatural. Violence toward nonbinary bodies and performances is meant to delineate what can be 
considered human. Consequently, innocuous tasks in the public world become threats to the 
nonbinary physical and psychic self.  
 For Spoon, ‘girl failure’ corresponds with a deep bodily shame. Raised in a Pentecostal 
household in Calgary, Alberta, Spoon comes of age steeped in conservative notions of 
appropriate gender roles and behavior. Despite having been socialized as a girl in such an 
atmosphere, Spoon says, “being a girl is something that never really happened for [them]” (27). 
This phraseology suggests that ‘being a girl’ is not an innate quality of the female body but 
rather something that has been imposed upon it, the social construction of the gender-neutral 
infant into a gendered being. Spoon feels they never went through this gendering process and 
instead remains – at their core – gender-neutral.  
 In an attempt to avoid verbal and physical retribution – and thus psychic discomfort – 
Spoon adopts a performance of binary femininity expected by their parents and peers. The 
disruption of this disguise occurs in a sex-segregated junior high gym class. One of the first 
activity units for the girls is dance aerobics; outside, the boys play rugby, which “look[s] 
violent,” but not as dangerous as what Spoon expects to experience on the dance floor (28). 
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Although their identity manifests as an uncomfortable and delinquent girlhood, the young Spoon 
already experiences the danger of the binary regulatory apparatus. Having been taught that 
dancing is sinful, Spoon finds that their body struggles with the movements that come so easily 
to the other girls. Spoon wonders whether their body also resists the overt feminine performance 
prescribed by an external social force (ibid.). The gym teacher, a compliant subject of the binary 
matrix, expects all of the girls in her class to step easily into the binary femininity that is their 
birthright. Because the binary other perceives Spoon’s body as female, Spoon feels a compulsion 
to conform; they participate in dance class until “some distant part of [their] psyche” impels 
them to literally bolt in fear from the gymnasium, escaping the binary expectations the instructor 
and their peers impose upon them.  
 This coercive binary conformity instigates a violent relationship between Spoon’s 
internal nonbinary self and their external perceived body. In the locker room of that same gym 
class, Spoon overhears their classmates talking about shaving their legs; ashamed of not having 
performed this binary behavior, Spoon ducks into a toilet stall to change (27) – like Coyote, 
Spoon finds refuge in the only individual space in the public locker room. This ‘girl failure’ 
torments Spoon throughout the day. That night in the bathtub, they use their mother’s pink razor 
to shave their legs; unskilled in this particular feminine act, Spoon cuts their legs (28). This first 
attempt to conform to binary gender expectations literally wounds the self, both at the level of 
the skin as well as on a psychic level; the blood dripping from Spoon’s legs embodies the razor-
edged divide between acceptable and delinquent gender performances. Puberty magnifies 
Spoon’s violent relationship with their body: it forces that relationship to become a battle of the 
internal self against the external self.  
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 Judith Halberstam characterizes puberty as the “persistence of the flesh,” a purely 
biological process that overrides the gendered identity (“Transgender” 465). As this persistence 
forces Spoon’s physical body to become categorically female, they believe that their internal self 
will “stay they same: ambivalent to the confusing expectations that surround [them]” (116). This 
split between internal and external selves suggests another psychic wounding that is deeply 
rooted in the negotiation of a nonbinary identity within a binary matrix; as (an unquestionably 
and visibly female) puberty progresses, Spoon loses control over their part in that negotiation 
and the split widens. Spoon’s body changes, taking on the anticipated female shape of their sex 
and as a result Spoon can no longer manipulate how others read their body. In a final bid to gain 
control over their physical body, Spoon decides to stop eating, to prevent the body they hate 
from becoming more abhorrent (ibid.).  
 Again the body suffers the psychic pain of occupying a gender non-space and almost 
disappears completely; Spoon recognizes that their body signifies a gender that they do not 
claim, and acts as a barrier to accurate perceptions by binary others. The binary other perceives 
Spoon’s nonbinary body from within the binary matrix and thus attempts to compel the 
perceived gender to fit into a binary category. Spoon’s acknowledgement of this process allows 
them to dismantle the enforced social construction of gender based on the body, thereby 
separating their gender identity from the appearance of their physical body. Only once this 
acknowledgement has been made can Spoon heal the division between internal and external 
selves.  
 Not all nonbinary individuals feel the need to medically alter their body in order to 
provide the binary other with an accurate reading of the nonbinary body. For Coyote, the surgical 
reconstruction of their chest – i.e. a double mastectomy – is necessary for bodily as well as 
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psychic comfort. In the medical process of physical alteration there is no traditional narrative for 
nonbinary bodies: bureaucratic gatekeepers familiar with transsexual surgical alterations (those 
that alter primary and secondary sex characteristics to align with an individual’s binary gender 
identity and are performed in conjunction with hormone therapy) find it difficult to approve a 
body for surgery when the patient does not intend to emerge on the opposite side of the binary. 
Coyote finds that, in order to be approved for insurance coverage, they have to perform a 
familiar binary transsexual narrative.  
 Coyote does not want to transition from female to male, but there is no narrative available 
for individuals who identify as Coyote does; of the many forms they had to fill out, Coyote says, 
“there is no box for not wanting a box at all. No one knows how to fix that” (70). For the 
bureaucratic gatekeepers, chest reconstruction surgery is ultimately about ‘fixing’ the patient so 
that they can accurately perform a binary gender, which, as far as the regulatory matrix is 
concerned, begins in the body. In fact, the pivotal question in Coyote’s initial interview with a 
therapist is whether or not Coyote wears a prosthetic penis (ibid.). Where their disinterest in 
taking hormones was sure to disqualify Coyote for insurance coverage, their affirmative answer 
to this question receives the therapist’s approval; the success depends wholly on Coyote’s 
adherence to binary norms, signified here by their desire for that immutable sign of maleness. 
Whether or not Coyote actually packs is irrelevant: what matters is that they must appear to live 
a binary narrative – written by binary, normatively gendered people – in order to achieve a 
livable body.   
 
II. Speaking a Language That Can Be Heard 
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 After positioning the physical body in the social world, the next strategy for articulating 
an existence is the use of language. For the nonbinary self, the articulation of existence 
inevitably comes up against the barrier of available language; no language for describing the 
nonbinary gender experience exists: articulation must be attempted via binary language. Gayle 
Salamon identifies self-definition as a linguistic act, thereby underscoring the power of language; 
at the same time, she acknowledges the difficulty in using language to articulate nonnormative 
genders: “gender...must be separated from language in order to be seen clearly, and the labor of 
elucidating that which escapes language through the use of language itself is a formidable and 
frustrating task indeed” (82). The nonbinary gender experience already seems unintelligible to 
the binary other; the use of the established language – in both pronouns as well as the adjectival 
agreement in romance languages – undermines the project of articulation by situating the 
nonbinary experience within the confines of binary understanding: the nonbinary self only 
approaches intelligibility through a reliance on the hegemonic gender system, a means that 
necessarily strips away the crucial independence from the binary.  
 The attempt to articulate the nonbinary experience resists Merleau-Ponty’s understanding 
of the social phenomenon of communication. He sees the system of communication as the self’s 
appropriation of the other’s thought as expressed through speech; this process not only enriches 
the self’s own thoughts, but also allows for the ability to think the way the perceived other thinks 
(179). Due to the linguistic and experiential barriers between the nonbinary and the binary, a true 
taking up of the other’s thoughts can never be achieved. For the binary other to be able to think 
according to the nonbinary self, a common language must be established, but, as Merleau-Ponty 
himself points out: “people can speak to us only a language which we already understand” (178); 
meaning can be ascribed to a signifying word only if we already possess the meaning. The 
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nonbinary gender identity must be psychically and bodily experienced in order for the meaning 
to be known. Self-articulation can attempt to define the nonbinary gender experience, but until a 
specifically nonbinary language exists, binary others will only ever understand the self on their 
own terms.  
 When language fails to achieve its goal, binary others cannot perceive the reality of the 
nonbinary existence; precise language allows the self to take up the other’s thoughts, and without 
it the distance between perception and reality cannot be bridged. Coyote describes this distance 
between them and the surgeon’s staff prior to their chest reconstruction surgery: although the 
staff has experience working with transgender patients and conducts their task professionally and 
amiably, Coyote “never quite feels like [the staff] truly [understands them]” (96). Even when the 
binary other can take in the general sense of the narrative told by the nonbinary self, a grasp of 
the reality of the nonbinary existence can never be fully reached: the staff do not already possess 
the meaning of the nonbinary existence. In other words, having not lived in opposition to the 
hegemonic social structure, the surgical staff cannot empathize with Coyote’s gender experience. 
Their resultant perception overlays Coyote’s reality, creating Husserl’s phenomenological 
“world” and discounting the authenticity of Coyote’s identity.  
 Nonbinary gendered individuals know that the language does not exist to accurately 
define their existence. Merleau-Ponty explains that, when direct perception fails to create an 
accurate understanding of the other, the self must rely on observed correlations between the 
experience of the self and the other (352); again, this precludes the authenticity of the reality, as 
the binary other lacks the experience to perceive actual correlations with the nonbinary self: thus 
the nonbinary existence is silenced or erased in the act of being perceived. The internal hurts this 
causes in the nonbinary self reifies the lack of space afforded them in the binary world. Coyote 
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acknowledges that the nature of communication between the nonbinary self and the binary other 
makes recognition impossible, and yet: 
[The] truth is that every time I am misgendered, a tiny little sliver of me 
disappears. A tiny little sliver of me is reminded that I do not fit, I am not this, I 
am not that, I am not seen, I can’t be recognized, I have no name. I remember that 
the truth of me is invisible, and a tiny little sliver of me disappears. Just a sliver, 
razored from the surface of my very thick skin most days, but other times right 
from my soul, sometimes felt so deep and other days simply shrugged off, but 
still. All those slivers add up to something much harder to pretend around. (246) 
Like Spoon, Coyote feels the razor-sharp edge of gender conformity. Their gender performance 
and identity do not line up with binary expectations, and so the reality of the nonbinary self is 
pared away until only a skeleton of their existence remains. Without the language to correct 
binary perceptions, Coyote and other nonbinary individuals must resign themselves to a narrative 
that can be interpreted by binary observers but that does not accurately reflect their identity or 
experience.  
 The binary narratives that nonbinary individuals tell must have some measure of 
familiarity for the binary other; this typically means such narratives fall within the category of 
transgender. Although many nonbinary people consider their identity to be a form of 
transgenderism, the transgender narrative still tends to exist within the binary structure: the 
dominant conception of a transperson is one that identifies with the gender at the opposite end of 
the spectrum and takes steps to embody that binary gender identity. Coming from a background 
of strict binary gender expectations, Spoon initially takes up the female-to-male transgender 
narrative. It “seem[s] to fit” for Spoon, who had never known that gender could be an option 
 
 52 
rather than a concrete fact. The move within the gender binary reaches Spoon’s deeper feelings 
of discontent with how their body represents their self; however, their body still poses a barrier 
for an authentic representation, but Spoon decides that this is due to their decision not to pursue 
hormones (as a musician by trade, Spoon cannot afford the vocal changes that testosterone would 
cause) (117).  
 As this binary transgender identity comes into conflict within the binary system, the fit 
becomes less accurate: Spoon realizes that even binary transgender people cannot meet the ideal 
social expectations of transmasculinity – the characteristics of the transman who consciously 
constructs sanctioned binary masculinity – and so stops attempting to present a body that fits 
either end of the binary spectrum, at last claiming a nonbinary identity (241). Spoon’s efforts to 
live a legible binary existence by way of a transgender narrative demonstrate the futility of such 
a feat: conceptions of transgender narratives as binary phenomena erase the reality of the 
nonbinary gender identity. Taking up this narrative as a person raised within the binary matrix 
and therefore performing a binary identity, Spoon experiences gender misperceptions and 
identity erasure; Spoon thus learns that the binary offers no space for their gender identity. The 
binary language they use to define their identity for themself creates the same distance between 
the lived and interior selves that exists between the nonbinary self and the binary other. This 
conceptual gap invalidates the nonbinary experience as the binary other situates it within a binary 
context.  
 In transitioning to a nonbinary gender performance, Spoon comes up against the question 
of pronouns. As the primary tool for delineating between gendered beings, pronouns pose a 
significant challenge in navigating the social world as a nonbinary person. Though many options 
for gender-neutral pronouns are unfamiliar (ze/zir/zirs, for example), but many nonbinary 
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individuals – perhaps in an attempt to remain somewhat legible to binary others – use the 
singular ‘they’ (“Need”). When Spoon initially learns that people use this pronoun, they think “it 
would be pretty hard to get people to actually call you that outside the queer community” (200). 
This concern gets at the issue of legitimacy often tied up in the use of language to articulate a 
nonbinary gender identity: Western language depends on a binary system for intelligibility, and 
so the binary world perceives any language that makes room for nonbinary articulation 
illegitimate. Endeavoring to use ‘they’ for others feels like learning a foreign language for 
Spoon; still living according to the binary matrix, Spoon themself struggles to accept this third 
gender pronoun as legitimate. As their gender identity shifts to nonbinary, however, “they” 
becomes to feel more accurate: the gender-neutral pronoun gives Spoon space to perform their 
gender without allowing the perceiving other to rely on language to read Spoon’s gender (201).  
 Coyote, too, uses “they” because it feels more right than either binary pronoun. That 
feeling of “rightness” plays a large part in living a livable nonbinary life for Coyote (221). 
Coyote and Spoon both strive to be recognized as their authentic selves; however, the terms that 
determine recognition originate in socially constituted binary gender norms. This imposition of 
conflicting terms, Butler claims, could make the subject’s life unlivable. Unlivability is not the 
terminus of imposed binary language: rather, Butler sees it as an opportunity for “establishing 
more inclusive conditions” for determining recognition (Undoing 4). The possibility for more 
inclusive conditions can be found in the acceptance of gender-neutral pronouns as legitimate. 
Pronouns, Coyote believes, should be used based on what makes a person comfortable. 
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning does not make sense for most binary-minded individuals, 
who understand that, even though the binary spectrum includes varying degrees of femininity 
and masculinity, “she” and “he” cover all possible gender identities.  
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 A linguistic common ground must be established so that the nonbinary existence can be 
accurately communicated to the binary other, thereby creating space in the lexicon for nonbinary 
voices. Currently, Coyote finds that they have to use language in such a way that ensures comfort 
for the binary other rather than expressing Coyote’s existence: by, for example, assuring the 
women in the public restroom that Coyote was also assigned female at birth (208). The common 
ground, then, is uneven. Because of their daily experience on such uneven ground, Coyote 
believes that a truly accurate language – binary or otherwise – cannot exist: “These are just 
words, and words are always imperfect, words are just sounds we make with our mouths that 
point our minds to think of things that cannot be fully described in words anyway” (247). 
Acknowledging the truth of this characterization of language – particularly the language meant 
to define the individual self – could establish a compromise – if not a common ground – where 
language is accepted as subjective. Such a compromise, while imperfect, would delay if not deny 
the imposition of the other’s meanings.  
 
III. Sexuality and the Gendered Self 
 The experience and performance of sexuality transforms the body into a means of 
relating to the external world. Merleau-Ponty considers sexuality the exemplar of transcendence 
because – via the animation of the body through desire – it establishes an experiential 
relationship between the self and the world (Salamon 56). Sexual relationships in the binary 
world force the nonbinary self to negotiate the conflict between the gendered self and the sexed 
body; the performance of the body does not necessarily result in an accurate portrayal of the self. 
Thus, a nonbinary individual whose gender identity is illegible at the bodily surface may have to 
work to earn a socially granted gender so as to receive the attention of the desired object; for 
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example, Spoon appears, at the surface, feminine, which becomes an obstacle when they try to 
date men. Often, Spoon’s appearance and voice prompts immediate dismissal by gay men and 
even friends: “You probably don’t have what I like in a man,” or “Honey, I don’t think he dates 
men like you” (175-6). This tendency to erase the non-normative gender identity and the self-
defined sexual orientation to only consider the sexed body demonstrates the serious inability of 
the binary other to take in all parts of the nonbinary existence in order to create a unified whole.  
 In response to these immediate dismissals, Spoon turns to Grindr, a dating app they hope 
will provide “a window into the world of gay male cruising” (176). What Spoon gets instead are 
cold rejections based entirely on the language they use to describe themself – i.e complete 
candidness about their transgender identity – rather than on their appearance and voice. 
(Although Spoon does include a photo of themself, because of the context in which it is viewed, 
others initially perceive Spoon as a younger effeminate man.) While Spoon has complete control 
in how they present their self, they still experience dismissal as a valid candidate for gay male 
sexual partner. Spoon learns that the rules that govern physical bodies in the gay community 
leaves little space for nonbinary bodies: all of the replies to their profile Spoon receives demand 
to know whether Spoon has had their genitals surgically altered (ibid.)  
 Just as in every other aspect of their life, Spoon must work against the norms that 
determine what gendered bodies are allowable in order to find a partner. Butler underscores the 
protective power of social norms against the threat of the uncategorizable other (Undoing 28): 
the gay community upholds strict norms for gender and sexual performances, which for many 
gay men means the presence of a penis; in other words, Spoon’s “female” anatomy represents for 
these men the possibility of being marked as heterosexual. This particular physical absence 
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causes Spoon to be read as ‘other,’ a threat that many of the men they find on Grindr are not 
willing to take on.   
 Eventually, Spoon turns back to their own queer community, meeting partners through 
friends. When they still identified as transgender, Spoon had to consciously maintain their 
gender narrative: new binary partners were subject to a vetting period to determine whether they 
really believed Spoon’s gender narrative. Spoon drew from existing heterosexual and 
homosexual narratives to establish the story of their relationships: for example, when dating 
women Spoon sought out women who identified as women and who accepted Spoon as a man, 
justifying their relationship as heterosexual (240). When they begin to identify as nonbinary, 
Spoon’s approach to relationships shifts. According to Butler, sexual orientation results from a 
very specific life history and narrative (Undoing 80); the fluidity of Spoon’s gender history has 
necessarily created a flexible understanding of sexuality and the narratives they tell reflect that. 
When they date, they have to find partners who understand Spoon as nonbinary (even if they 
cannot fully comprehend ‘nonbinary’), and they still need to agree on a narrative – one where the 
relationship is not gendered at all (242). The narratives are important: they provide guidelines for 
Spoon and their partner for how society will expect the couple to interact with each other and the 
world.  
 Coyote’s sexual narrative lacks the fluidity of Spoon’s: their binary gendered partner has 
remained a constant throughout Coyote’s gender journey. The two do not rely on a narrative 
(binary or otherwise) to understand their relationship. Consequently, they have achieved a level 
of intimacy where the binary other comes close to perceiving the reality of the nonbinary self. 
Coyote’s partner knows how Coyote experiences their nonbinary existence to the best of her 
ability. However, she cannot perceive Coyote’s existence fully unless she physically and 
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psychically experiences Coyote’s nonbinary gender: despite their intimacy, there will always be 
that disparity of perception. Their intimacy, though, allows Coyote to relate to the external world 
– in the form of their partner – with nearly complete authenticity. Laurie Spurling suggests that 
“[there] are times of almost total integration between consciousness and body, in those moments 
when we are truly ‘at home’ in our bodies (such as, perhaps, sexual intercourse) and experience 
our body, not as a screen between us and the world, but as our opening onto the world” (24). 
Coyote’s desire for their partner and the intimacy they share situates Coyote in the world as a 
sexual being whose gender identity, for the moment, is not relevant in the experience of the 
body. At the same time, their partner does not need to define Coyote’s gender in order to 
perceive them as a sexual being; Coyote can, as Spurling suggests, experience the world as a 
physically and psychically unified whole.   
 
IV. The Nonbinary Self as Social Object 
 The meaning of an individual’s existence depends entirely on their interactions with the 
social world. The binary matrix is a permanent field of existence, and though the self may turn 
away from it, the meaning of their gendered existence will always be situated in relation to it 
(Merleau-Ponty 361); the pervasiveness of the binary matrix makes total escape from its 
constraints impossible. The nonbinary self, then, must negotiate the binary structure of the social 
world in order to maintain their existence. Friction between the nonbinary self and the external 
world – caused by binary others, gender norms, and physical spaces – threatens the stability of 
the nonbinary identity. As a result of their negative experiences with public restrooms, Coyote 
feels that the conflict arises from the exclusion of nonbinary people from public spaces: “we live 
in a world that is unable to make room enough for trans people to pee in safety” (205). The 
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physical and social structures of the binary world are not accessible for nonbinary individuals, 
causing people – including Coyote – to seek out wheelchair-accessible, gender-neutral 
restrooms; consequently, the nonbinary gender identity becomes a literal impairment for 
navigating the external world. Coyote, though, does not see women in public restrooms as 
adversaries, but rather “the potential for many built-in comrades in the fight for gender-neutral, 
single-stall locking washrooms in all public places” (208). Sex-segregated restrooms allow 
gender-normative women to police unintelligible nonbinary bodies; gender-neutral restrooms 
would not only protect the safety of both groups but also make room for nonbinary people within 
the physical and social binary architectures.  
 An individual claims space within the binary social structure in their use of identity 
labels. The identity labels that nonbinary individuals use can sometimes overlap and conflict 
with binary notions of identity. Coyote, for example, still identifies as butch; in their usage, 
however, “butch” does not qualify the noun “woman” (233). Although butch is a binary term 
used primarily in the lesbian community to signify masculinity, Coyote has claimed it as a 
gender category for their nonbinary identity; for them, ‘butch’ occupies the non-space outside the 
gender binary, although others do not always read it as such. In all perceptive acts, the binary 
other will resist nonbinary readings and will instead project the binary system onto the nonbinary 
self. Coyote finds that, even in the queer community, others ascribe differing binary gender 
labels to them in an effort to ‘claim’ Coyote as a spokesperson. After a solo show in Seattle, a 
woman approaches Coyote and thanks them for speaking up for butch women; Coyote smiles, 
but does not feel that had been the crux of their show. Shortly after the woman leaves, a young 
man steps up to Coyote to thank them for representing transgender men; again, Coyote just 
smiles, knowing that correcting the man will serve no purpose (233-4). Both communities, in 
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claiming Coyote as their own, perform the binary violence of erasing Coyote’s actual identity. 
Coyote understands that the misinterpretation stems from “limited language and the scarcity of 
shared meanings of words” (235); as with binary others, the nonbinary self can achieve a 
linguistic common ground with a queer other only if the other has literally experienced the 
nonbinary existence. These grateful individuals, though queer, are both subjects of the binary 
matrix, forming binary interpretations of Coyote’s nonbinary narrative.  
 According to Michel Foucault, all social interactions involve the expectation of 
surveillance. The nonbinary self, consequently, monitors its behavior to avoid the retribution of 
binary judges (Crawley et al 89). Like Coyote, Spoon performs on public stages and faces the 
scrutiny and judgment of binary audiences. As a musician, Spoon has to negotiate their presence 
as an object onstage with their gender presentation. When they begin to take their music on tour, 
Spoon is strictly a country singer, a predominantly heteronormative genre. They soon find that 
the patrons in the venues that book small-time country singers cannot conceive of anything 
outside the binary; Spoon has to censor themself in their music to avoid physically violent 
retribution for straying from accepted binary behavior (136).  
 By situating their gendered body on a stage, Spoon offers it up to the other’s gaze. 
Merleau-Ponty considers the gaze that runs over the self’s body constitutive of a dialectic of the 
self and other in which the gaze of the other has the ability to steal the body from the self (167). 
When Spoon performs their music in homophobic and transphobic venues, the patrons’ gaze 
steals Spoon’s body as well as the gender identity Spoon inscribes at its surface. To preserve the 
meaning of their gender performance, Spoon begins to selectively choose venues where patrons 
allow Spoon to break gender rules; such patrons also seem more accepting of Spoon breaking 
musical genre rules (164). Spoon’s musical career can serve as a microcosm of their nonbinary 
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gender experience: the hazards Spoon’s objective body encounters in the binary social world 
constructs the performance of their gendered body; binary observers who find some intelligibility 
in Spoon’s performance allow Spoon to bend norms (even slightly) to suit their identity.   
 Spoon’s performing career makes them hyperaware of the violence of the other’s 
perceptive gaze. They understand that in social interactions binary individuals compulsively 
assign a gender to one another and act out the appropriate script (217). The meaning of gender 
and gender performances depends on how others external to the self perceive and interpret a 
gendered existence, despite the self’s autonomous quest for recognition; Butler calls this the 
“lively paradox” of gender presentation (Undoing 21). Once a coherent meaning is acquired, the 
binary other imposes it on the nonbinary self, erasing the actual nonbinary existence. The reality 
of this erasure disrupts Spoon’s performance of their authentic nonbinary self: because the 
instinct is to assign binary gender narratives to the nonbinary self for intelligibility, Spoon must 
know how others read their gender in order to know how to behave so they might be recognized 
as human.  
 Most of Spoon’s public interactions “involve the immediate assignment as a woman, or 
the slow reveal of people discovering they would rather assign [Spoon] to the category of 
female” (251). The binary social world seeks to organize and regulate its subjects through social 
norms: while Spoon’s performed self may appear ambiguous, the combination of their 
appearance and voice (both unaltered by medical intervention) signals to the binary other that 
Spoon is a woman. Spoon and Coyote – whose identity queer binary others overwrite – 
experience the perceptive act as one that erases their gender identities. Because the available 
modes of self-articulation – bodily and verbal – become meaningful only in the other’s 
perception, the nonbinary self must accept a compromise in their gender performance: Coyote, 
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for example, allows themself to be viewed as both a butch lesbian and a transgender male 
because they know those individuals need the validation Coyote provides in their work; they use 
the feminine pronoun when doing work in public schools because they “want those women and 
girls to see every kind of she there can be” (222). Coyote’s nonbinary self loses its visibility in 
these interactions; however, the strategic production of binary intelligibility allows them to 
encourage gender difference and ambiguity in others, opening up the breadth of accepted 
gendered realities just a little.  
 
 
  Before any social interaction begins, Spoon wants to ask the other, “what do you think I 
am” (217)? The binary other’s perception of Spoon’s gender presentation determines the 
performance expected of Spoon for their gender identity to be considered intelligible. In the 
construction of that intelligibility, the destructive power of the binary other’s gaze erases the 
reality of the nonbinary existence in the very moment the nonbinary self is being perceived. 
Nonbinary individuals like Spoon and Coyote threaten the binary worldview, denaturalize gender 
categories, and insert themselves into the social world as gendered beings; Spoon and Coyote’s 
experiences in public spaces and interactions with binary others demonstrate the instability of the 
binary gender system. The wounding of Spoon’s physical body and the abuse Coyote 
experiences in public restrooms suggest that the fierce policing of binary boundaries reifies the 
constraints of accepted gender norms: the apparently delinquent body of the nonbinary self faces 
violent retribution for refusing binary gender categories.  
 The phenomenological investigation of nonbinary genders suggests that individuals who 
do not experience the nonbinary reality cannot fully comprehend that reality. Coyote’s 
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interactions with their surgeon’s staff illustrates this impossibility: although everyone in the 
surgeon’s office has experience working with transgender individuals who need to surgically 
alter their body to make it livable, Coyote can feel that they are not wholly understood by the 
binary staff (96). Cognitively, the staff understands the logic that drives Coyote to pursue chest 
reconstruction surgery, but without having experienced the psychic and physical nonbinary 
reality, the staff cannot reach complete empathy.  
 Binary perception of the nonbinary self only ever exists on the terms of the binary matrix: 
intelligibility of the nonbinary existence originates in binary meanings, necessarily erasing the 
meanings that determine that nonbinary existence. At the same time, the nonbinary self must rely 
on the binary framework to inform their gender experience. For example, Spoon and Coyote both 
situate themselves linguistically in relation to binary constructs: each claims the pronoun ‘they’ – 
the existing binary third-person pronoun – as a nonbinary designation. In doing so, Spoon and 
Coyote resist gender conformity by confounding binary meanings and appropriating space in the 
binary construct for nonbinary articulation.  
 If the body is the first cultural object, Merleau-Ponty wonders how that object can 
produce a legible existence (348). Positioned in a perceptual field grounded in binary contexts, 
the nonbinary body rejects all of the meanings that make an existence legible to the binary other. 
Spoon and Coyote frequently manipulate binary constructs to understand their own gender 
identities – e.g. in their use of pronouns or in constructing narratives of sexuality – but still resist 
binary legibility. As the site of initial contact between nonbinary self and binary world, the body 
visually articulates the nonbinary experience; however, any perception formed by the binary 
other will necessarily overwrite the nonbinary reality with binary meanings. Nonbinary 
narratives, though constructed from elements and repurposed meanings of the binary gender 
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construct, oppose the binary worldview; a “limited language and scarcity of shared meanings” 
makes true empathy with the nonbinary existence impossible for the binary other.   
 Gender Failure showcases the real life experiences of two nonbinary gendered 
individuals. Both the original show and the text are intended for an audience of unlimited gender 
and sexual identities: although only nonbinary audience members will experience the narratives a 
profound empathy, everyone has the ability to make space for the nonbinary reality in their 
understanding of gender. Public speakers like Spoon and Coyote put themselves at the mercy of 
the violence of the perceptive act; although their authentic selves may disappear in the face of 
binary perception, the candidness of their gendered realities make space for their existence, 
starting with those who choose to hear their stories.  
 
.   
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Conclusion 
Making Space 
 In May 2011, Kathy Witterick published an article in the Ottawa Citizen stating that she 
and her husband planned raise their new baby gender-neutrally. This would mean keeping the 
baby’s sex private from all but a select few and letting them vocalize their own gender identity 
once that identity took shape. The family received over a hundred interview requests and were 
the subject of global debate about raising a child without gender; public response ranged from 
vocal support to accusations of child abuse. Their plan was not to force the child to identify as 
nonbinary but rather, by not imposing the gender binary, they could gift their child autonomy in 
defining its gender identity without the influence of social norms (Witterick).  
 The Wittericks faced opposition in the wake of this article precisely because the reality of 
nonbinary was made so visible. Ostensibly, the worry was that the child would be the victim of 
bullying simply because they used different pronouns or did not present a binary gender 
performance; in fact, the people who cried abuse embodied the fear of the nonbinary: their 
concern was not for the child as an individual, but as a subject whose mere upbringing would 
challenge the notion of a stable binary truth. The possibility that parents could give their children 
freedom from the regulatory binary system proved that the binary is not inherent: stripped of its 
“natural” status, the binary loses its normative power.  
 Can a child be raised completely gender-neutrally? In a matrix where everything is 
defined by its relation to a binary, it seems unlikely that parents could totally avoid the influence 
of gender norms. Certainly the Wittericks’ alternative lifestyle makes their decision feasible: all 
three of their children are homeschooled, and the family lives off the grid in a remote area in 
Ontario (Poisson). Removed as they are from society, the child can grow up without oppressive 
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gender expectations; but not everyone has this luxury. In fact, Halberstam believes that trying to 
avoid gendering a child is a futile task. Instead he calls for encouraging alternative forms of 
femininity or masculinity that go against social expectations – for example, encouraging forms of 
female culture that do not require dolls and makeup, or discouraging the masculine activity of 
bullying (Danbolt).  
 Halberstam’s work in transgender theory primarily explores the alternatives: alternative 
genders, alternative sexualities, and alternative ways of being. His response to gender-neutral 
parenting suggests that authentically living without gender is perhaps too alternative within the 
binary matrix. Spoon’s and Coyote’s experiences do demonstrate the difficulty of presenting an 
intelligible nonbinary gender identity – but does this mean that there is no space for an authentic 
nonbinary existence in the binary matrix?  
 Nonbinary individuals like Spoon and Coyote make small efforts every day to claim 
space for themselves: both have chosen gender-neutral pronouns; Spoon establishes gender 
narratives with romantic partners to maintain their nonbinary identity; Coyote resists tradition 
medical transition as the binary matrix defines it. While these small acts do not demand a gender 
revolution, they do make it possible for Spoon and Coyote to live according to their authentic 
self. Their work as public speakers and entertainers presents the reality of the nonbinary 
experience; in doing so, nonbinary audience members feel their identity validated, while their 
binary peers are made aware of the broad spectrum of human experience.   
 Complete empathetic understanding is impossible between any individual, binary or not: 
a life would have to be identically experienced in order for two people to totally share meanings. 
The nature of the nonbinary gender experience – one that goes so completely against the binary 
hegemony – means there is an unbridgeable gap in empathy between the nonbinary self and 
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binary other. However, this does not mean that nonbinary is illegitimate and untenable in a 
binary context; indeed, the existence of Gender Failure demonstrates that nonbinary as a 
category can be presented in such a way that it becomes accessible for even a binary audience. If 
complete empathy is unattainable, the public lives of Spoon, Coyote, and the Wittericks 
demonstrate that such unequivocal empathy is not necessary for a valid nonbinary experience.  
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